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I. INTRODUGrION 
Federal courts entertain petitions by state prisoners for habeas 
corpus relief "only on the ground that [the prisoner] is in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."l 
Federal courts substantively and procedurally liinit the types of com-
plaints which they will entertain.2 First, federal courts will not hear 
claims that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
was admitted at the petitioner's trial as long as the petitioner had a 
*Copyright 1993, Rachel A. Van Cleave, 
**Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law School; Adjunct Professor of Law, Santa Clara Univer-
sity School of Law. B.A. 1986, Stanford University; J.D. 1989, University of California, Has-
~ings College of the Law; J.S.M., Stanford Law School (expected 1994). The author would 
like to thank the following people for their helpful comments and suggestions on an ear-
lier draft: Barbara A. Babcock, David C. Faigman, and Robert Weisberg. Thank you also to 
Leslie Joyner Bobo who provided useful materials from the Derden case and to Joseph 
Schottland for editorial and other support. 
'28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3) (1988). For an excellent discus-
sion of the history of the writ of habeas corpus, see generally, William F. Duker, A Constitu-
tional Histqry of Habeas Corpus (1980). 
'The list of limitations in the text is not exhaustive. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 
(1989) (a "new rule" will not be applied to a habeas corpus petition); McCleskyv. Zant, 449 
U.S. 467 (1991) (failure to raise a claim in first habeas corpus petition will bar subsequent 
petition absent a showing of "cause and prejudice"). 
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"full and fair" opportunity to litigate the claim in state court.s Second, 
federal courts will not grant habeas relief where the prisoner com-
plains of a violation of state law unless the violation amounts to a con-
stitutional deprivation.4 Third, a constitutional violation may not 
mandate issuance of the writ where a federal court determines that 
the error was harmless.5 Additionally, the petitioner must not have 
defaulted her claims by, for example, failing to object to the alleged 
error at trial, or otherwise failing to follow state procedural rules.6 Fi-
nally, a petitioner must exhaust all of his claims in state court before 
he may petition for federal habeas corpus relief. 7 
Typically, courts grant habeas relief based on a single, non-harmless 
constitutional violation. But what about the cumulative effect of sev-
eral errors? Should not ~ court grant habeas relief where a petitioner 
alleges several "constitutional errors" each' of which is "harmless" but 
which, in the aggregate, denied the petitioner of a fair trial? Or may 
the petitioner allege several errors of state law, none of which individ-
ually amounts to a constitutional violation, but again, had a cumula-
tive effect on the fairness of the trial? What should federal courts do? 
The United States Supreme Court has not considered the use of cu-
mulative error analysis in habeas corpus petitions and recently denied 
certiorari in a case which squarely presented these issues.s 
The issue regarding the parameters of "cumulative error analysis" 
raises several difficult questions. First is the situation where a habeas 
corpus petitioner alleges several "constitutional errors," meaning spe-
cific errors which clearly violate specific constitutional standards. In 
this situation, federal courts employ a type of cumulative error analysis 
by evaluating the overall prejudice that the defendant suffered as a 
result of these "constitutional errors." While a court might find that a 
single constitutional error was harmless in a particular case, cumula-
tive error analysis requires a court to determine whether several "con-
stitutional errors," otherwise individually harmless, were collectively 
harmful. This is a "cumulation of harmlessness," which entails more 
of a quantitative analysis of the petitioner's trial. 
'Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). 
"Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991). 
'Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
"Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
728 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (requiring federal 
courts to dismiss habeas petitions presenting any un exhausted claims). 
"Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), ccrt. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 
(1993). For a discussion of cumulative error in civil cases, see Jack Kenneth Dahlberg, Jr., 
Analysis of Cumulative Error in the Harmless Error Doctrine: A Case Study, 12 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 
561 (1981). 
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The next situation is where a habeas corpus petitioner argues errors 
of state law.9 As previously indicateq, claimed errors of state law are 
not cognizable in federal habeas corpus review. However, at some 
point, numerous errors of state law may operate together to deprive a 
petitioner of a' fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Such a qualitative analysis raises questions as to 
the definition of a fair trial. 
The final situation consists of a grey area between the situations de-
scribed above. This scenario involves errors which are not state law 
errors, but neither are they bad enough to amount to federal constitu-
tional errors; for example, errors which fail to meet a specific stan-
dard like "cause and prejudice." Again, such errors individually are 
not of constitutional dimension and thus are generally not cognizable 
in habeas corpus review. However, as with state law errors, at some 
point these types of "errors" might also aggregate to deprive one of a 
fair trial. This article addresses the second and third of these situa-
tions, which otherwise might .fall through the cracks, precluding 
habeas corpus review. 
A majority of federal courts entertain habeas corpus petitions re-
questing relief based on the "cumulative effect" of several errors, each 
of which, when considered alone, would not warrant habeas relief, but 
when taken together indieate that the petitioner has suffered a due 
process violation. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has determined that "each habeas claim must stand or fall on its 
own"IO and therefore does not consider the cumulative effect of sev-
eral errors on the trial. However, the Eighth Circuit does not offer a 
persuasive reason for this conclusion. I I 
While the vast majority of habeas petitions alleging cumulative error 
fail, only a few cases analyze in any detail precisely what "cumulative 
error analysis" entails, and even fewer define the types of "errors" 
which courts should consider for purposes of cumulative error analy-
sis. Generally, when evaluating cumulative error claims, courts deter-
mine that the petitioner has not alleged any "constitutional errors" 
and deny relief. This approach often excludes or ignores alleged er-
rors which individually do not reach constitutional dimensions. By 
excluding non-constitutional errors from the cumulative error analy-
sis, federal courts employ a different analysis for due process viola-
tions in habeas petitions than they use in direct appeals, or in federal 
9 A very narrow definition of state law is intended here, limited to violations of state 
constitutions and state statutes. 
IOScott v.Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990). 
11 See infra Section II, C. 
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criminal cases.12 In federal criminal cases, courts may reverse a con-
viction in one of three ways: based on a single constitutional error;!!1 
based on the cumulative effect of more than one constitutional but 
harmless error;14 and based on the aggregate effect of several non-
constitutional errors. I5 There is no persuasive reason for federal 
courts to employ a different standard when reviewing the fundamen-
tal fairness of a trial in habeas corpus review. 
Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to consider cu-
mulative error claims in habeas corpus petitions, but at the same time 
severely limited the types of "errors" which federal courts could con-
sider for purposes of cumulative error. I6 One such limitation is that 
the Fifth Circuit will not consider a violation of state law, for purposes 
of cumulative error analysis, unless that violation amounts to a consti-
tutional deprivation of due process. Therefore,.before the court will 
consider a violation of state law for purposes of cumulative error anal-
ysis, that violation must first pass the threshold of amounting to a due 
process violation. However, this is the same standard which errors 
considered individually must meet. This common standard is whether 
the petitioner's trial was fundamentally unfair such that "there is a 
reasonable probability that the verdict might have been different had 
the trial been properly conducted."17 If such an error reaches this 
threshold, cumulative error analysis would not be necessary since the 
writ would be issued based on the single state law violation which de-
prived the petitioner of a fundamentally fair trial. This prong of the 
lOIn this article the term "direct appeal" refers to appeals taken from a state's court of 
last resort to the United States Supreme Court. The term "federal criminal cases" refers to 
cases appealed from federal district courts to federal courts of appeal and/or, the United 
States Supreme Court. "Habeas corpus" refers to the "federal remedy available to a state 
prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of confinement and seeks as relief her imme-
diate or speedier release." Project; Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United 
. States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1991-1992, 81GEO. LJ. 853,1562 (1993). "Collat-
eral attack" is another way to refer to habeas corpus petitions challenging the constitution-
ality of the state conviction. 
U See Derden v. McNeel, 938 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1991) (panel opinion) and cases 
cited therein. See also, Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527 (3d Cir. 1991). 
I'See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462 (lOth Cir. 1990) (en banc) (allowing the 
cumulation of constitutional and non-constitutional errors in review of federal criminal 
cases). 
I·Id. 
16 Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Arguably, the Fifth Circuit 
recognized cumulative error analysis in habeas corpus review in Mullen v. Blackburn, 808 
F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1987). However, in Mullen, the court did not devote much discussion 
to cumulative error analysis, but it denied the petition on the grounds that the petitioner 
had failed to allege any errors at all stating, " [t]wenty times zero equals zero." Id. at 1147. 
17Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 279 (5th Cir. 1985), cen. denied, 476 U.S. 1178 
(l986); Derden v. McNeel, 938 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1991), rerJ'd, 978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 
1992)(en banc), cen. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928(1993). 
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Fifth Circuit's analysis amounts to allowing courts to consider only the 
cumulative effect of constitutional, but individually harmless errors, 
and is different from the analysis used in the review of federal crimi-
nal cases. Rather than dismiss errors which individually are not "con-
stitutional errors," federal courts should more closely examine what 
constitutes an "error" and then proceed to evaluate the cumulative 
effect of the errors. 
This article first addresses the question of whether courts should 
consider cumulative error analysis in habeas corpus cases, or whether 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is correct that each error must 
stand on its own. Mter concluding that cumulative error analysis 
should be a cognizable issue in habeas corpus petitions, the question 
of whether courts should employ a different standard for habeas peti-
tions alleging cumulative error is addressed. Emphasis is placed on 
the Fifth Circuit case, Derden v. McNee~18 and. that court's rationale for 
imposing limitations on habeas corpus petitions alleging cumulative 
error. The Fifth Circuit's four-prong test for evaluating petitions al-
leging a due process violation based on the cumulative effect of "er-
rors" is critiqued. Finally, this article proposes a standard for 
cumulative error analysis that more carefully defines "error" and sug-
gests that habeas corpus counsel point to specific legal standards vio-
lated by the alleged error. This standard requires that federal courts 
consider a broader range of "errors" as well as the relationship among 
the errors, in order to evaluate whether a trial was fundamentally 
unfair. 
II. WHY CUMULATE? 
There are at least three reasons why an allegation that aggregated 
errors deprived the petitioner of a 'fair trial is a cognizable claim in 
habeas corpus petitions. First, federal courts already consider the cu-
mulative effect of errors on direct review. Second, there is no reason 
to exclude cumulative error analysis from the scope of habeas corpus 
review since such a claim is premised upon the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and falls outside the scope of Stone v. 
Powel~ which excluded Fourth Amendment claims from habeas 
corpus review. Finally, the only circuit which refuses to cumulate er-
rors alleged in habeas petitions has provided little analysis as to why 
courts should not cumulate errors .. 
18978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993). 
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A. Cumulative Error Considered on Direct Review 
In Taylorv. Kentucky,19 the Supreme Court accepted the notion that 
several errors, none of which individually rise to constitutional dimen-
sions, may have the cumulative effect of denying a defendant a fair 
trial. Taylor involved a direct appeal from a state court conviction of 
robbery which had been affirmed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.20 . 
The Supreme Court reversed based on the following: 1) the trial 
judge rejected the defendant's presumption of innocence instruction; 
2) the prosecutor was allowed to read the indictment to the jury in the 
absence of an instruction to the jury that the indictment did not con-
stitute evidence; 3) the prosecutor improperly made comments link-
ing the defendant to every defendant previously sentenced to 
prison;21 and 4) the instructions which were given by the judge were 
"skeletal, placing little emphasis on the [state's burden] to prove the 
case beyond a reasonable doubt and none at all on the jury's duty to 
judge [the defendant] only on the basis of the testimony heard at 
trial."22 
The Court acknowledged that the phrase "presumption of inno-
cence ... may not be constitutionally mandated,"23 but in Taylor, such 
an instruction was essential to a fair trial due to the other circum-
stances listed above. Significantly, the Court did not expressly find 
that the failure to instruct on the presumption of innocence consti-
tuted reversible error. Rather, the Court examined the absence of 
this instruction along with the effect of other alleged errors. As to the 
prosecutor's comments, the Court stated that "standing alone, [such 
comments] would [not] rise to the level of reversible error .... They 
are relevant to the need for carefully framed instructions designed to 
assure that the accused be judged only on the evidence."24 In fact, the 
Court even hedged on concluding that some of the prosecutor's com-
ments were improper, stating, "the combination of the skeletal instruc-
tions, the possible harmful inferences from the references to the 
indictment, and the repeated suggestions that [defendant's] status as a 
defendant tended to establish his guilt created a genuine danger that 
19 436 U.S. 478 (1978) . 
• oThe Supreme Court of Kentucky denied discretionary review. Id. at 483. 
21 Specifically, the prosecutor stated that the defendant "like every other defendant who's 
ever been tried who's in the penitentiary or in the reformatory today has the presumption 
of innocence until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 486. The Court found 
that this statement "could be viewed as an invitation to the jury to consider petitioner's 
status as a defendant as evidence tending to prove his guilt." Id. at 487. 
22Id. at 486. 
"'Id. at 485. 
24Id. at 487, n.14. 
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the jury would convict ... [defendant] on the basis of those extrane-
ous considerations. "25 
The Court did not decide whether the trial court committed revers-
ible error by refusing to instruct the jury that the indictment was not 
evidence. Furthermore, the Court declined to hold that the judge's 
instruction defining guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" as "a substan-
tial doubt, a real doubt," constituted reversible error. Instead, the 
Court stated that "the cumulative effect of the potentially damaging cir-
cumstances of this case violated the due process guarantee of fundamental 
fairness in the absence of an instruction as to the presumption of 
innocence. "26 
Taylor demonstrates that in the absence of any individually revers-
ible errors, the Supreme Court has considered the cumulative effect 
of several errors with respect to a claim alleging that the defendant 
was denied a fair trial. In Taylor, the Court did not assess each error to 
determine whether it was individually harmless. As to at least one er-
ror, the Court did not expressly find that an alleged error actually 
constituted "error." Nor did the Court concern itself only with errors 
which individually were of constitutional dimension. Rather, the 
Court evaluated the circumstances surrounding the defendant's trial 
to determine that the state had denied the defendant fundamental 
fairness as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Again, this is a claim that the petitioner was denied a 
fair trial by a state court, and except for the procedural posture of the 
case, is no different from a federal habeas corpus petition challenging 
the fairness of the trial. Certainly, if federal courts will hear direct 
appeals alleging a denial of fundamental fairness based on a cumula-
tion of several errors, they must also entertain such claims asserted in 
habeas corpus petitions. 
B. No Stone-Bar to Cumulate Errors on Habeas 
As discussed above, federal courts have applied cumulative error 
analysis in federal criminal cases to determine whether the aggregate 
effect of errors at trial was so prejudicial as to require a reversa1.27 
Under cumulative error, a petitioner essentially alleges that she was 
deprived of fundamental fairness due to accumulated errors at trial 
.. Id. at 487-88 (emphasis added). 
2·Id. n.l5 (emphasis added). 
"United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990) (en bane) (denied reversal of 
conviction based on the cumulative effect of otherwise harmless errors); United States v. 
Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Birdsell, 775 F.2d 645, 654 (5th 
Cir. 1985), eert. denied, 476 U.S. 1119 (1986). 
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which individually are not constitutional violations. In effect, the peti-
tioner claims a Fourteenth Amendment due process deprivation. 
While the Supreme Court has eliminated habeas corpus review of 
Fourth Amendment violations in Stone v. Powel~28 a due process claim 
based on the cumulative effect of errors falls outside the parameters 
of Stone, which the Court has subsequently limited to Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule violations. 
The petitioners in Stone sought habeas corpus relief on the basis 
that illegally obtained evidence had been introduced at their state tri-
als. The Supreme Court addressed: 
whether a federal court should consider, in ruling on a peti-
tion for habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim 
that evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or 
seizure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously 
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation of 
his claim in the state courts.29 
The Court balanced the justifications for enforcing the Fourth 
Amendment via the exclusionary rule on collateral attack against in-
trusion on the values of finality and federalism when federal courts 
grant habeas relief to state prisoners. For several reasons, the Court 
concluded that federal courts were not to entertain claims of exclu-
sionary rule violations on collateral attack.30 
First, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule, applied to the 
states in Mapp v. Ohio,3l is not "a personal constitutional right,"32 but 
rather serves to deter future Fourth Amendment violations and thus 
should only be applied where "'its remedial objectives are thought 
most efficaciously served.' "33 The Court found that collateral consid-
erations of Fourth Amendment violations would only "add marginally 
to an awareness of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment,"34 
given the likelihood that a habeas claim could occur years after the 
alleged violation. 
Second, the Court emphasized that allegations that illegally ob-
tained evidence was admitted at trial rarely involved questions that the 
conviction was unreliable. In fact, the Court stated that "the physical 
evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most 
28 428 u.s. 465 (1976). 
29 [d. at 469. 
"'For a discussion of this balancing, see Peter McConnack, Comment, Habeas Corpus and 
Due Process: Stone v. Powell Restricted, 17 Hous. L. REv. 923, 928-30 (1980). 
"367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
"Stone, 428 U.S. at 486. 
"[d. at 486-87 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974». 
··[d. at 493. 
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probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant. "35 
The Court further stated that habeas corpus petitions "for purposes 
other than to assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitu-
tional loss of liberty results in serious intrusions on values important 
to our system of government."36 This suggests that the Court's reason-
ing could apply to exclude from habeas review other claims that are 
not relevant to a petitioner's guilt or innocence.37 The broadjustifica-
tions which the Court relied qn to limit habeas corpus review dis-
turbed several commentators who feared that the court was preparing 
to exclude other claims from habeas review, especially if the claims 
did not bear directly on the guilt or innocence of the petitioner.38 
The Court has been restrained in extending the application of 
Stone. For example, in Kimmelman v. Morrison,39 the Court refused to 
extend Stone to preclude habeas corpus review of a Sixth Amendment 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the trial attorney's 
failure to seek exclusion of allegedly illegally obtained evidence. Over 
defense counsel's objection, the trial court permitted the prosecutor 
to introduce the evidence ruling that defense counsel should have 
made a pre-trial suppression motion. Upon the Supreme Court's con-
sideration of the habeas petition, the state argued that the Court 
should not allow the petitioner to circumvent the Stone-bar by stating 
his claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel, rather than the 
admission of illegally obtained evidence. However, the Court rea-
soned that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is a "funda-
mental right ... [and] assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of 
our adversary process. "40 In contrast, the exclusionary rule is simply a 
judicially created remedy to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights. 
Thus, when an asserted right goes to the fairness and reliability of a 
conviction, Stone will not apply to bar federal habeas corpus review. 
"[d. at 490. 
"'[d. at 491 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the "costs" of federal habeas corpus 
review, see Sandra Day O'Connor, Habeas cqrpus and Judicial Federalism: Some Thoughts on 
Finality, Comity and Error Correction, PUB. INTEREST L. REv. ANN. 3 (1992). 
S7 See Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While it Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 13 
n.28 (1990). 
"Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander A1einikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and 
the Court, 86 YALE LJ. 1035, 1086-95 (1977); Neil McFeeley, Habeas Corpus and Due Process: 
From Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 533, 553 (1976). See also, Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 74~, 786 (1987). But see, Henry J. 
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant' Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 
142 (1970). 
59 477 u.S. 365 (1986). 
40 Id. at 375. 
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Kimmelman substantially limited Stone by emphasizing the impor-
tance of the right to effective assistance of counsel. However, this re-
sult, along with other cases considering a Stone-bar, implies a hierarchy 
of constitutional rights based upon the relationship of a particular 
right to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner.41 Nonetheless, while 
Stone seemed to hint at requiring the petitioner to make a colorable 
claim of innocence, in Kimmelman, the court relied more generally on 
the significance of effective counsel to the fairness, and thus reliability 
of a criminal trial. 
In Jackson v. Virginia,42 the Court refused to apply Stone to habeas 
petitions alleging that the conviction had been obtained on insuffi-
dent evidence. In Jackson, the petitioner, while admitting that he 
committed homicide, claimed that the evidence regarding premedita-
tion was insufficient to support a first degree murder conviction. The 
state argued that Stone bars federal habeas corpus review once a de-
fendant has received a full and fair hearing in the state courts regard-
ing a sufficiency of the evidence claim. The Court rejected this 
argument, reasoning that pursuant to In re Winship,43 due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that state prosecutions be 
supported upon proof of each element beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and that this issue is "central to the basic question of guilt or inno-
cence."44 As in Kimmelman, the Court appeared to rely, not on 
whether the petitioner can claim actual innocence, but rather 
whether the right she asserts is one which bears directly on the relia-
bility of the conviction, and thus on the issue of her guilt or 
innocence. 
As to an issue not relating to guilt or innocence, the Supreme Court 
refused to extend the Stone-bar to habeas petitions alleging constitu-
tional violations implicating the integrity of the judiciary in Rose v. 
Mitchell 45 In Rose, the petitioner alleged that the grandjury foreman 
had been selected in a discriminatory manner, violating the· Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court distin-
guished the Stone justification that state courts are equally capable of 
adjudicating Fourth Amendment claims. In Rose, the Court stated 
that where a petitioner alleges that the "state judiciary itself engages in 
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is a 
41 See, Kevin J. O'Brien, Comment, Federal Habeas Review of Ineffective Assistance Claims: A 
Conflict Between Strickland and Stone?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 183 (1986). 
42 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
"397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
"Jackson, 443 U.S. at 323. 
"443 U.S. 545 (1979). See also, William F. Duker, Rose v. Mitchell and Justice Lewis Powell: 
The Role of Federal Courts and Federal Habeas, 23 How. LJ. 279 (1980). 
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need to preserve independent federal habeas review .... "46 The 
Court also stressed the integrity of the judicial system as a concern 
substantially greater in the context of grand jury discrimination cases 
than in the context of violations of the exclusionary rule. "The claim 
that the court has discriminated on the basis of race . . . brings the 
integrity of the judicial system into direct question."47 Thus, even 
where a particular right has little, if any, relevance to the guilt or inno-
cence of the habeas petitioner, federal courts will entertain such alle-
gations on habeas corpus review if the right bears on the integrity of 
the judicial system. 
Most recently, in Withrow v. Williams,48 the Court refused to extend 
Stone to claims that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda v. 
Arizona49 was introduced at trial. The Court reasoned that, unlike the 
exclusion of illegally obtained physical evidence mandated by Mapp, 
Miranda "safeguards a 'fundamental trial right."'50 Furthermore, in 
Stone, the Court relied in part on the inherent relia~ility of the ille-
gally seized evidence as a reason for foreclosing habeas review if the 
petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the Fourth 
Amendment claim in state court. In contrast, the Court in Withrow 
stated that the right protected by Miranda did not "serve some value 
necessarily divorced from the correct ascertainment of guilt,"51 but 
rather many statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be unre-
liable. As in Kimmelman and Jackson, the Court emphasized the impor-
tance of the right asserted by the petitioner and how that right has the 
potential to diminish the reliability of the conviction, thus necessitat-
ing independent federal habeas review. 52 
Regardless of whether Stone was correctly decided, given subsequent 
limitations on the application of Stone, it is not a bar to habeas corpus 
relief based on the allegation that the petitioner was denied a fair trial 
due to the aggregate effect of several errors, each of which is either 
harmless, or individually fails to am~unt to a "constitutional error." 
46 Id. at 563. 
'7Id. 
48 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993). 
<9384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
'"Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 
(1990) (emphasis added)}. 
01 Id. 
"'In another recent case, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993), the Court 
cited to Stone in applying a different standard for determining the harmlessness of constitu-
tional errors in habeas corpus petitions than the standard used on direct review. However, 
Stone is relevant to the question of whether federal courts may exclude certain types of 
claims from habeas corpus review. The issue of whether federal courts should entertain a 
particular claim in habeas petitions is different from the question of what standards federal 
courts should apply when reviewing a habeas claim rather than a claim on direct review. 
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Again, this type of allegation is premised on the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. It therefore involves the integrity of the 
state judiciary, similar to the issues involved in Rose, especially where 
the petitioner claims that the trial judge'S conduct contributed to the 
unfairness of his trial. As in Rose, where the state judge is accused of 
impairing the fairness of a defendant's trial, a defendant should have 
a federal forum. Similar to the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
rights asserted in Kimmelman and Jackson, a Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process right to a fair trial is a fundamental, trial, and personal 
right, since it alleges that the petitioner has been denied fundamental 
fairness.53 Furthermore, where alleged errors are relevant to the cred-
ibility of the witnesses,54 as in Derden v. McNee~55 such a claim can bear 
directly on the reliability of the .verdict and, thus relate to the guilt or 
innocence of the habeas petitioner. Thus, Stone does not exclude alle-
gations of cumulative error resulting in a deprivation of due process 
from habeas corpus review. 
C. The Unpersuasive Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit is the only federal jurisdiction which refuses to 
cumulate Due Process errors alleged by a habeas petitioner. However, 
this circuit has never provided detailed reasoning for refusing to con-
sider the aggregate effect of alleged errors. Instead, the Eighth Cir-
cuit has used sweeping language in its first case considering the 
question which subsequent opinions nave routinely quoted. 
In Lee v. Lockhart,56 the petitioner argued that evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment had been admitted at his trial. 
The court, citing Stone v. Powel~ held that such an error is not a cogni-
zable issue since the petitioner received a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. The petitioner attempted to 
avoid the Stone-bar by arguing that this was not the only alleged error. 
In this context, when the petitioner alleged an error which federal 
courts are not to consider at all, the court stated that" [e] ach claim of a 
constitutional deprivation asserted in a petition for federal habeas 
"'In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 698 (1984), the Court describes an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim as an "attack on the fundamental fairness" of the trial. The 
Court then states that "fundamental fairness is the central concern of the writ of habeas 
corpus." [d. 
"See United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1988), affd, 902 F.2d 1578 (1990). 
""978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), cm. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993). 
"754 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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corpus must stand on its own, or, as here, fall on its own, and Lee's 
Fourth Amendment claim must fall under Stone. "57 
This was the extent of the court's analysis. In fairness to the court, 
the petitioner in Lee did not allege that several errors cumulatively 
deprived him of a fair trial; rather, he argued that the court should 
consider the Fourth Amendment violation because this was not his 
sole claim of error. 
In subsequent Eighth Circuit cases, the court has routinely quoted 
the above language from Lee and refused to consider the cumulative 
effect of otherwise cognizable habeas corpus claims on the peti-
tioner's trial.58 Certainly, where federal courts will not hear particular 
claims at all, the petitioner may not avoid such rules by arguing that 
there are other errors. Similarly, where a petitioner has failed to ex-
haust all of his claims in the state courts; he may not avoid the exhaus-
tion requirement by arguing that he has also alleged claims which he 
has exhausted. This would defeat the purpose of the exhaustion re-
quirement.59 However, unlike Fourth Amendment claims and non-
exhausted claims, federal courts will entertain petitions alleging errors 
which deprived the petitioner of a fair trial. Such claims come under 
a due process analysis and have yet to be excluded by the Supreme 
Court from habeas corpus jurisdiction. Thus, the Eighth Circuit's re-
fusal to consider the aggregate effect of alleged errors is unsupported 
and unpersuasive. 
Furthermore, while the Eighth Circuit will not consider errors 
which individually are not of constitutional dimension in habeas 
corpus claims, the court will consider the cumulative effect of coun-
sel's errors for purposes of a Sixth Amendment violation alleged in a 
habeas corpus petition.60 In Harris v. Houseurright,61 the petitioner 
sought habeas corpus relief, claiming that he did not receive effective 
assistance of counsel at his state trial and pointed to several "errors" 
made by his appointed counsel. The Eighth Circuit stated that "[n]o 
single error made by the petitioner's appointed counsel is of constitu-
tional dimension. Yet, when viewed cumulatively, the multiple errors 
... demonstrate that counsel's total performance was below the level 
>7 Id. at 279. 
"Scott v.Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990), em. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1626; Byrd v. 
Armentrout, .880 F.2d 1, 11 (8th Cir. 1989), em. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990); Cooley v. 
Lockhart, 839 F.2d 431, 432 (8th Cir. 1988); Wedemann v. Solem, 826 F.2d 766, 767 (8th 
Cir. 1987); Hobbs v. Lockhart, 791 F.2d 125, 127-28 (8th CiT. 1986). 
'9Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 
""Harris v. Housewright, 697 F.2d 202, 206 (8th Cir. 1982). 
6'697 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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of professional skill."62 The court expressly rejected the State's argu-
ment that the court should evaluate each mistake individually, stating, 
"[ w] e cannot ... view the individual mistakes committed by the peti-
tioner's attorneys in isolation. The record, viewed as a whole, estab-
lishes that the defense counsel's [sic] overall performance and the 
cumulative effect of their multiple errors denied Harris effective 
assistance. "63 
There is no reason to refuse to cumulate errors for purposes of a 
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, but to permit the accumu-
lation of errors for purposes of a Sixth Amendment ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claim. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit does not 
explain the reason for this inconsistency. If several errors by counsel, 
each of which individually do not amount to a Sixth Amendment vio-
lation, but cumulatively may have deprived a person of effective assist-
ance of counsel, then several trial errors cumulatively may have 
deprived a person of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. There is 
no reason to distinguish between these two fundamental trial rights. 
III. CUMULATIVE ERROR AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS 
. As discussed earlier, most federal courts devote little analysis to the 
appropriate parameters of a cumulative error claim. In federal crimi-
nal cases where a defendant has alleged cumulative error, federal 
courts examine whether the errors rendered the trial fundamentally 
unfair. A trial is fundamentally unfair if "there is a reasonable 
probability that the verdict might have been different had the trial 
been properly conducted."64 Except for the Eighth and Fifth Circuits, 
no federal courts make an explicit distinction between cumulative er-
ror alleged in direct appeals and cumulative error in habeas corpus 
petitions. While the Eighth Circuit's discussion of the distinction is 
cursory, in Derden v. McNee~65 the Fifth Circuit recently provided ex-
planations for analyzing cumulative error in haQeas petitions 
differently. 
A. The Fifth Circuit "Beauty Contest '66 
Mr. George Guy Derden was convicted of burglary in the Circuit 
Court of Clay County, Mississippi and was sentenced to seven years in 
6' [d. at 206 (emphasis added) . 
.. [d. at 212 (emphasis added). 
"Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1985), ecrt. denied, 476 U.S. 
1178 (1986). 
6'978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), ecrt. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993). 
66 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1463 (Garza, j., dissenting). 
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prison.67 The burglary for which he was convicted occurred February . 
10, 1983; however, Mr. Derden was not indicted until October, 1985, 
and his trial began on April 14, 1986. At trial, the State presented the 
testimony of three individuals who admitted involvement in the bur-
glary: Willie Sherrod, Jay Posey, and Tommy Turner.68 They testified 
that the burglary had been planned by Ricky Forrestor, who was not 
charged and did not testify at tria1.69 These three testified that they 
accompanied Mr. Derden, and his girlfriend, Pam Smith, in his van 
on the drive from West Point, Mississippi to Wade's Grocery in Pheba 
and participated in the burglary which was interrupted by an ap-
proaching car. They estimated that the burglary had occurred be-
tween 12:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. The witnesses who had chaSed off the 
burglars testified that they had called the deputy sheriff to report the 
incident at 1:00 a.m.70 However, the police log which the state failed 
to produce showed that the call had not been made until 2:05 a.m.71 
The three burglars testified that upon being chased off, Turner, 
Smith, and Derden drove away, leaving Sherrod and Posey stranded.72 
Sherrod and Posey then obtained a ride back to West Point from two 
farmers who testified that they arrived in West Point by 2:00 a.m. and 
returned to Pheba by 2:30 a.m. Turner testified that Mr. Derden 
drove himself, Turner, and Smith to Houston, Mississippi, taking back 
roads, stopping for gas and to fix a defective tail light, before re-
turning to West Point. Sheriff McNeel had Turner duplicate the 
route and estimated that it took Derden, Turner, and Smith three 
hours and fourteen minutes to drive from the scene of the burglary to 
Houston and back to West Point.7!! However, the testimony of the 
state's witnesses established that the burglary had occurred at 12:30 
a.m., and Sherrod and Posey testified that when they returned to West 
Point at 2:00 a.m., Turner and Derden were already there.74 
Mr. Derden maintained that he did not participate in the burglary. 
He testified that on the day of the burglary, Sherrod, an employee at 
Derden's carpet store, asked to swap cars with Derden.75 The two 
later met at the Apollo Club and traded cars. Derden testified that he 
·'Derden v. McNeel, 938 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1991) (panel opinion) (citing 522 So. 2d 752 
(Miss. 1988» . 
.. [d. at 607. 
"[d. at 608. 
,old. 
" [d. at 617. 
'12[d. at 608. 
15 Id. 
"[d. 
,. [d. at 608-09. 
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. and Smith then drove to Houston to measure homes for carpet instal-
lation, asking a police officer in Houston for directions and stopping 
for gas. While Derden produced the receipt for the gas, he could not 
remember the location of the homes he had measured for carpet. 
Smith testified that she had been present when Sherrod asked to bor-
row Derden's van and when the two swapped cars.76 She also stated 
that she had gone with Derden to Houston to measure homes for car-
pet. Two other witnesses testified that they were also present and 
heard Sherrod ask to borrow the van on the night of the burglary.77 
The jury convicted Derden. of burglary and the judge sentenced 
him to seven years in prison. Sherrod, Posey, and Forrestor were not 
indicted for burglary, and Turner received a five-year suspended sen-
tence with five-years probation.78 
Mr. Derden appealed his conviction to the Mississippi Supreme 
Court which determined that Mr. Derden alleged only one error wor-
thy of discussion, that the prosecutor improperly sought commitments 
from the jurors during voir dire that they would view the testimony of 
the co-conspirators as th~y would any other witness.79 Mr. Derden's 
counsel had objected to the prosecutor's repeated question, but the 
judge overruled these objections.8o The Mississippi Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the prosecutor's questions violated state law. How-
ever, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the trial court 
cured the error by instructing the jury at the end of the. trial that they 
were to "regard this t~stimony [of the co-conspirators] with great suspi-
cion and to consider it with caution."81 The court then summarily 
dismissed Mr. Derden's other allegations of error, stating, "[t]he other 
assignments of error have been studied and are without merit and 
unworthy of discussion. "82 
Mr. Derden then petitioned for habeas corpus relief in federal 
court, alleging the same errors he had alleged in his direct appeal to 
the state supreme court. The magistrate determined that no individ-
ual error alleged by Mr. Derden entitled him to habeas corpus relief, 
but that "the trial judge'S demeanor coupled with the prosecutor's over-
zealous actions combined to produce a prejudicial atmosphere 
76Id. at 609. 
77Id. 
7·Id. 
79Derden v. State, 522 So. 2d 752, 753-54 (Miss. 1988). 
""Id . 
• , Id. at 754 . 
•• Id. at 755. 
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throughout petitioner's trial,"8g t4us entitling ,Mr. Derden to habeas 
corpus relief. 
The district court determined that while the Fifth Circuit has "indi-
cated a willingness to consider the cumulative prejudice resulting 
from trial errors in direct appeals, ... it has also indicated that cumu-
lative error is not a proper basis upon which to grant habeas corpus 
relief. "84 Relying on Mullen v. Blackburn,85 the district court con-
cluded that the Fifth Circuit did not recognize cumulative error analy-
sis in habeas petitions. 
1. The Panel Majority 
The Fifth Circuit panel opinion accepted the doctrine of cumula-
tive error as a basis for habeas corpus relief for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the petitioner was denied a fair trial.86 The court 
acknowledged that while the Fifth Circuit had not expressly recog-
nized cumulative error in habeas petitions, the Fifth Circuit had con-
sidered cumulative error allegations in direct appeal cases, and the 
majority of sister circuits permit such allegations in habeas petitions.87 
The court emphasized that cumulative error analysis involves a "Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process inquiry," and the~efore they were not 
creating new law, but merely "applying that which was secured to the 
accused over two hundred years ago. "88 Explaining the application of 
cumulative error analysis, the court stated that "[t]here is no set 
formula and each case must be independently examined."89 The re-
viewing court must determine "whether the trial taken as a whole is 
fundamentally unfair."90 While this does not mean that a petitioner is 
entitled to a perfect trial,91 if ·"there is a reasonable probability that 
"'Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, 31 (emphasis added). 
"District Court Memorandum Opinion, 2-3 (citations omitted). Alternatively, the dis-
trict court found that Mr. Derden's petition was not "one where the aggregate of the errors 
produced a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that petitioner was denied due process of 
law." Id. at 4. 
8'808 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (the court found that the petitioner had failed to 
allege any error at all, stating, "[t]wenty times zero equals zero."). 
86Derden v. McNeel, 938 F.2d 605, 609-10 (panel opinion), (5th Cir. 1991), em. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992). . 
87Id. at 610. 
88 Id. at 610. 
89 Id. at 609. 
VOId. 
9' See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) ("the Constitution entitles a crim-
inal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one."). 
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the verdict might have been different had the trial been properly con-
ducted," then the trial lacked fundamental fairness.92 
Applying this standard for fundamental fairness, the panel agreed 
with the magistrate that due to the cumulative effect of the judge's 
conduct during trial,93 the prosecutor's improper questions,94 and the 
weakness of the evidence against Mr. Derden, he suffered a due pro-
cess violation entitling him to habeas corpus relief.95 Similar to the 
Supreme Court's holding in Taylor,96 the panel majority found that 
when considered individually, the above three "errors" did not re-
quire habeas corpus relief. However, their cumulative effect rendered 
Mr. Derden's trial fundamentally unfair.97 
The panel found that the prosecutor's repeated attempts during 
voir dire to secure the jury's agreement to view the testimony of the 
co-conspirators as they would that of any other witness contributed to 
a denial of due process.98 The prosecutor was allowed to ask the ju-
rors seven times whether they would believe the testimony of the ad-
mitted burglars. While each question was slightly different, the 
following is representative: 
. . . as I understand it, you are all telling me that you will 
weigh [the co-conspirator's] testimony as you would anybody 
else's. If anybody says that they cannot do that, that they 
could not weigh their testimony as they would anybody else's 
would you please indicate it now by raising your hand?99 
The Mississippi Supreme Court found this questioning incorrectly 
stated the law that jurors must view the uncorroborated testimony of 
an accomplice "with great caution and suspicion."loo Despite the fact 
that defense counsel objected four times to this questioning, the 
judge did not sustain the objection, nor did he instruct .the jury as to 
the correct state of the law when defense counsel objected. Instead, 
the judge stated, "[a]ll right, the record will reflect your objection. 
go Derden, 938 F.2d at 609-10 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 278-79 (5th 
Cir. 1985), ccrt. denied, 476 U.S. 1178 (1986» . 
•• [d. at 611-15 . 
•• [d. at 615-17 . 
•• [d. at 618. 
96 See supra, Section lIA . 
• ? Derden, 938 F.2d at 618 . 
.. [d. at 615-17 . 
.. [d. at 615-16. The prosecutor also asked the following questions: "would ... anybody 
simply disregard the testimony of [the co-conspirator's] simply because of a plea bargain 
arrangement with them?" "Do any of you feel that such testimony from such witnesses is 
inherently untruthful?" [d. 
100 [d. at 616 (panel opinion). 
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You may proceed .... The Court will instruct them on that, Coun-
selor, at the proper time."lOl At the end of the trial, the judge in-
structed the jury that they were "to regard this testimony [of the co-
conspirator] with great suspicion and caution."I02 While the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court found that this cured the error, the Fifth Circuit 
disagreed stating that "[t]his miniscule instruction at the end of the 
trial could not possibly have overcome the damage that was done at 
voir dire."!03 
The prosecutor also improperly elicited evidence of other crimes 
allegedly committed by Mr. Derden, from co-conspirator Sherrod.104 
Defense counsel cross-examined Sherrod on his motive for testifying 
against Derden. Sherrod admitted that he faced charges for prior 
criminal activity which the prosecutor had agreed to drop. On redi-
rect, the prosecutor began to question Sherrod further on these other 
. crimes. Defense counsel objected, stating that he believed the prose-
cutor was about to ask an improper question. 105 The judge overruled 
the objection and the prosecutor asked Sherrod, "[i]n all of these rob-
beries . . . who was involved with yoU?"I06 Sherrod responded, 
"George Derden." Upon defense counsel's second objection the 
judge stated, "[a]ll right the objection is now sustained, and the jury 
will be admonished to disregard that remark." Although the judge 
immediately instructed the jury to d!sregard the statement, the panel 
found that the prosecutor "blatantly disregarded the law of Mississippi 
and introduced evidence of another crime separate from that charged 
in the indictment."!07 The panel stated that this conduct alone would 
not require habeas corpus relief but it "contributed significantly to 
[Mr. Derden's] deprivation of due process."I08 
The panel also quoted several portions of the trial transcript which 
demonstrated thafconduct by the judge "tended to lead the jury to 
believe that Derden and his counsel were not to be believed."lo9 Dur-
ing defense counsel's opening statement, the judge sustained several 
101Id. at 615-16. 
l"'Id. at 616 n.3. 
10'Id. at 616. As to the need for immediate curative instructions, see United States v. 
Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 63 (3rd Cir. 1976), em. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). 
104 Derden, 938 F.2d at 616-17. 
10'Specifically, defense counsel stated, "[ylour Honor ... I object to this and I'd like to 
make a record on it probably outside the presence of the jury. It's improper [reldirect; it's 
grossly improper as [the prosecutor 1 knows and I'd like to make a record on this because I 
think I know what he's fixing to try to do." Derden, 938 F.2d at 616. 
I06Id. 
107Id. at 617. 
losId. 
ICJ9Id. at 611. 
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of the prosecutor's objections on' the basis that defense counsel was 
arguing his case. IIO However, the record indicates that defense coun-
sel was attempting to walk the jury through the complicated and con-
tradictory state's evidence to show that Mr. Derden could not possibly 
have been involved in the burglary. I I I The judge also chastised de-
fense counsel in the absence of an objection.1l2 
The trial judge also reprimanded Mr. Derden on several occasions. 
Mr. Derden testified that he had filled the van with gas the same day 
Sherrod asked to borrow it. Turner had testified that upon returning 
to West Point after the burglary, he and Mr. Derden had stopped for 
gas. Defense counsel asked whether, assuming Turner was telling the 
truth, the van would have needed gas. Mr. Derden responded, I'[t]hat 
van could have gone to Memphis, Tennessee without needing any 
gas."113 Defense counsel then attempted to introduce into evidence 
Derden's receipt showing that Derden had filled the van with gas. 
The judge interrupted with the following: "Let me caution the wit-
ness. Mr. Derden, I don't care if it [the van] had gone to Memphis or 
Chicago and the jury don't [sic] care either; just answer his question, 
do you understand?"1l4 
The Fifth Circuit panel found that this testimony was crucial. 
"Derden wanted to discredit Turner's testimony that the van used in 
the burglary had gassed up in Houston," concluding that "[t]his is im-
portant because the trial judge's comment seemed to indicate he did 
not care whether the van would have needed any gas in Houston."1l5 
When defense counsel attempted to enter into evidence business 
records showing where he had installed carpet the following day, the 
prosecutor objected that they were not relevant. The judge stated, 
"[c]ounsel, he's testified where he was. Now I don't know what you're 
trying to do with the records .... I am not going to let these records 
in. He can testify where he was and what he did."1l6 
II°Id. 
III Id. 
"'The following is one such occasion. When attempting to recross Sherrod on whether 
he had an opportunity to talk to the other co-conspirators, the judge stated "[clounsel, 
what difference does it make if he had an opportunity to talk every day if he didn't talk. 
Cross examine him on the times he did talk to them." The judge also demonstrated that 
he was not paying attention when during defense counsel's closing argument, the prosecu-
tor made an objection to which the judge responded, "I just wasn't paying any attention; I 
don't know what was said, Counsel, but you may proceed." Id. at 612. 
mId. 
114Id . 
... Id. at 613. 
116Id. 
1994] HABEAS CORPUS AND CUMULATIVE ERROR ANALYSIS 79 
On cross-examination of Mr. Derden, the prosecution indicated 
that there was nothing on the gas receipt to indicate when it had been 
made, and Mr. Derden responded, " [w]ell, I've been injail, ladies and 
gentlemen, since January twenty, eighty-[sic]eighty-five .... "117 The 
judge interrupted, "must a minute. Face the lawyer and answer the 
lawyer's questions, and you do not address the jury, you understand? 
I'm not going to caution you about this again."118 The panel stated 
"[s]uch a remark was inexcusable and could leave no other impression 
with thejury [than] that Derden was guilty."1l9 
While the panel concluded that the judge's comments considered 
individually did not deny Mr. Derden a fair trial, when considered 
together, they "substantially contributed to [Mr. Derden's] deprivation 
of due process."120 
The final contributing factors were the prosecutor's suppression of 
a police radio log, and the weak and contradictory evidence given by 
the co-conspirators.121 The radio log indicated that the witnesses who 
chased off the burglars called the police at 2:05 a.m. This could have 
been used to impeach these witnesses since they had testified that they 
called at 1:00 a.m. It could have also impeached the testimony of the 
three co-conspirators by discrediting their account of what occurred 
and when on the night of the burglary. As to the contradictory testi-
mony of the three admitted burglars, the panel found that while this 
alone was not a due process violation, it "bolsters our conclusion that 
a violation of the Due Process Clause occurred."122 
As the Supreme Court determined in Taylor, the panel found that 
none of the errors individually required relief. Nor did the panel as-
sess whether each error was harmless .. Rather, the court examined the 
circumstances of the trial and concluded that the errors added up to a 
"glaring violation of due process."123 
2. The En Bane Court 
The Fifth Circuit then considered the case en bane and reversed the 
panel opinion. 124 Writing for the en bane court, Judge Edith Jones 
117 Id. at 614. 
118Id. 
II°Id. 
'20 Id. at 615. 
'0' Id. at 617-18. 
'ftld. at 617. 
'0' Id. at 618. 
'''Derden v. McNee~ 978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), eert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 
(1993). It is interesting to note that the panel had denied the state's request for a rehear-
ing and for a rehearing en bane. Fifth Circuit Local Rule 35 allows an aetive judge on the 
court to request the Chief Judge to poll the court for an en bane hearing. Since Judge 
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prefaced the opinion by noting that the idea that federal courts enter-
tain a habeas corpus petition alleging "a series of events none of 
which individually violated a defendant's constitutional rights seems a 
difficult theoretical proposition .... "125 While the court joined the 
m.yority of circuit courts in recognizing habeas corpus allegations that 
the cumulative effect of trial errors may deprive one of a fair trial, the 
court established a four-prong test limiting the types of errors which 
the court will consider. First, a cumulative error allegation "must re-
fer only to errors committed in the state trial court. . .. If an action of 
the trial court cured a putative error, the petitioner is complaining 
only of an adverse event rather than actual error."126 Second, alleged 
errors must not be procedurally bC;lrred.127 Third, the court will not 
consider errors of state law unless the errors rise to "constitutional 
dimension."128 Finally, federal courts "must review the record as a 
whole to determine whether the errors more likely than not caused a 
suspect verdict."129 This new test so limits ~he errors which the Fifth 
Circuit will consider in the aggregate that it undermines the Four-
teenth Amendment right to due process and the fundamental right to 
a fair trial. 
B. Two Standards for Fundamental Fairness? 
The Fifth Circuit's en bane opinion imposes three limitations that 
are not part of cumulative error analysis in federal criminal cases or in 
direct appeal cases. This raises the question of whether federal courts 
should employ a different due process analysis for habeas corpus peti-
tions than that used in cases on ~irect appeal. Previously, this com-
ment examined whether cumulative error analysis is a cognizable 
claim in habeas corpus petitions. Once federal courts recognize cu-
mulative error analysis, the next question is whether courts should ap-
ply a different analysis depending upon whether the claim is raised in 
a direct appeal or in a habeas corpus petition. 
Jones wrote the dissent to the panel opinion and the opinion of the court en bane, it ap-
pears that she also requested that the entire court be polled on the issue of whether to 
hear the case en bane. Furthermore, given Judge Reynaldo Garza's comment that "[t]his 
case has turned into a beauty contest between me and Judge Jones," indicates that there 
was probably a great deal of letter writing among the judges about this case. Id. at 1463 
(Garza, J., dissenting). 
'25 Id. at 1456. 
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The Fifth Circuit justified the more limited standard for cumulative 
error on habeas corpus review for several reasons. First, "[t]he stan-
dard for reversal on direct appeal of a criminal conviction, . . . , 
should logically be more flexible than that available on collateral re-
view."I30 Judge Jones, however, failed to explain why this is "logically" 
so. Rather, the court pointed to Supreme Court opinions stating that 
the Due Process Clause has limited application, and that "the category 
of infractions that violate 'fundamental fairness' [has been defined] 
very narrowly."131 Therefore, courts must exercise caution in holding 
that an error which does not amount to a constitutional error "by it-
self might suddenly, when aggregated with other non-constitutional 
errors, become worthy of habeas relief. "132 
The Supreme Court has stated that fundamental fairness is a very 
narrow concept and has described denials of due process as "the fail-
ure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept 
of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the 
absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained 
of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial. "133 How-
ever, the Court has not imposed a different standard for fundamental 
fairness for habeas corpus cases. In fact, the Court has never devel-
oped different standards for other constitutional rights when a habeas 
petitioner has alleged a violation. For example, whether alleged on 
direct appeal, or on habeas corpus, the standard for a Sixth Amend-
ment ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the same. 1M Very few 
cases, whether on direct appeal or habeas corpus review, demonstrate 
a deprivation of fundamental fairness. This fact alone does not pro-
vide the logic for a narrower standard for such a claim alleged by a 
habeas corpus petitioner. 
The Fifth Circuit states that federal court consideration of a cumu-
lation of non-constitutional errors as a basis for habeas corpus relief 
"may too easily conflict with established limits on the scope of federal 
habeas relief."135 The court cites three United States Supreme Court 
.. Old. at 1457. 
151 Id. (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990». 
mId. 
15SLisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). 
"'One must first show that counsel's performance was deficient and second that this 
deficient performance was so prejudicial that the result of the trial is unreliable. Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Strickland is a habeas corpus case, however the 
Court applied the same standard in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), which the 
Court heard on direct appeal. 
,.. Derden, 978 F.2d at 1458. 
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decisions in order to justify its limitations on habeas corpus cumula-
tive error analysis.136 However, the three cases cited do not involve 
the use of a different constitutional standard for habeas corpus peti-
tions. Rather, these cases state various procedural limitations on habeas 
corpus relief. 
In Coleman v. Thompson,137 the Supreme Court held that federal 
habeas review is presumptively barred if it "fairly appears" that the 
state court's dismissal was based "primarily" on a state procedural 
rule. 138 Certainly, Mr. Derden should not be able to circumvent the 
Coleman limitation by arguing cumulative error if one or more of his 
claims were procedurally barred by a state rule. However, this limita-
tion is not relevant in Derden, where the Mississippi Supreme Court 
summarily dismissed all but one of his allegations without providing 
any statement that his other claims were barred by state law. Further-
more, the state did not argue that Mr. Derden's claims were procedur-
ally barred.139 
The Derden court also cited McCleskey v. Zant,140 which applied a 
broader definition of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. Pursuant to 
McClesky, when a petitioner has failed to raise a particular claim in her 
first habeas corpus petition, she will be barred from raising the claim 
in subsequent petitions, unless she is able to show cause for failing to 
raisethe claim in the initial petition and actual prejudice to her case if 
the court refuses to grant relief. 141 Since Mr. Derden has filed only 
one habeas corpus petition, the court cannot accuse him of abusing 
"the Great Writ." 
Finally, the court cited Teague v. Lane,142 which set out the standard 
for determining whether a "new rule" will be applied to cases on col-
lateral review. Derden does not involve the issue of a "new rule." Fur-
thermore, while Teague states a different standard for the application 
of new rules on habeas corpus than cases on direct review, retroactiv-
ity, addressed in Teague, is not a constitutional doctrine, unless of 
,.. [d. 
"'111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). 
156 [d. at 2554. In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, III S.Ct. 2590 (1991), the Supreme Court further 
loosened this standard by holding that if a lower state court based its dismissal on state 
procedural grounds, federal courts could infer that appellate state courts relied on similar 
grounds. 
""The en banc opinion concedes that "[n]either the state courts nor Mississippi's brief 
has relied on procedural bar." Derden, 978 F.2d at 1459 n.8. 
140 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
141 [d. at 1470. 
142 489 U.S. 288 (1989). For a critique of Teague, see Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 
45 VAND. L. REv. 797 (1992). 
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course the issue is the application of an ex post facto law.148 Due pro-
cess and fundamental fairness are constitutional doctrines. Courts 
should use the same standards whether the claim is a federal criminal 
case, direct appeal, or a habeas corpus petition.' 
These three cases relied upon by the Fifth Circuit do not directly 
support the conclusion that a different standard of fundamental fair-
ness applies when such an allegation is raised in a habeas corpus peti-
tion rather than on direct review. However, these cases do support 
the Supreme Court's emphasis on the need for finality of state court 
judgments. Certainly, the Supreme Court has emphasized the impor-
tance of finality of state court judgments, as well as notions of federal-
ism. Any habeas corpus petition will raise concerns of finality and 
federalism.144 While the Fifth Circuit is probably correct in stating 
that federal courts must exercise caution when evaluating a claim that 
a trial was fundamentally unfair, they must also exercise caution when 
deferring to these practical concerns as a basis for altering a constitu-
tional standard. 
A recent example of these concerns "running amok"145 is Brecht v. 
Abrahamson.146 In Brecht, the petitioner claimed that the state had re-
ferred to Brecht's post-Miranda silence in violation of due process 
under Dayle v. Ohio.147 The issue was whether the state had to meet 
the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman' v. California148 for 
constitutional errors, or whether the harmlessness standard for non-
constitutional errors in Kotteakos v. United States149 applied. The 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Dayle rule, rooted in fundamental 
fairness and due process concerns, is constitutionally based, and not 
simply a "prophylactic rule. "150 Nonetheless, the Court held that 
where a constitutional error is alleged by a habeas corpus petitioner, the 
Chapman "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not ap-
ply.151 Instead federal courts are to apply the less stringent standard 
of Kotteakos.152 
10 u.s. Const. art. I, § 9, d. 3. 
144SeeJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979). 
I"Judge Jones speaks of the danger that cumulative error analysis may easily "run amok" 
and "swallow the jurisprudence construing specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights." 
Derden, 978 F.2d at 1457. 
146 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). 
147426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
148 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967) (reversal not required where constitutional error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
149 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
I !SO Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717. 
151Id. at 1721-22. 
152Id. at 1722. 
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Under Kotteakos, a court may find a non-constitutional error harm-
less if it "did not influence the jury, or had but very slight ef-
fect .... "153 Justice Stevens' concurrence maintains that the burden is 
still on the prosecution to demonstrate harmlessness.154 However, 
Justice White reads the majority opinion as placing the burden on 
habeas corpus petitioners to show that the error "resulted in 'actua,l 
prejudice.' "ISS The Court justified this distinction based on prece-
dent noting that "collateral review is different from direct re-
view .... "156 The plurality opinion also emphasized frequently used 
reasons for distinguishing between collateral review and direct review 
- finality of convictions, comity and federalism. 157 Justice O'Connor, 
in dissent stated that these concerns "are inevitable whenever[habeas] 
relief is awarded,"158 and she cautioned that "decisions concerning 
the Great Writ 'warrant restraint' ... for [the Court] ought not to take 
lightly alteration of the 'fundamental safeguard against unlawful 
custody.' "159 
The dissenting opinions in Brecht seem to accord the Chapman 
harmless error standard constitutional status and emphasize the need 
for the more stringent standard to assure the protection of federal 
constitutional rights.160 In contrast, the majority fails to explain the 
nature of the Chapman standard; whether it is simply a "prophylactic" 
rule to protect constitutional rights, or whether it is constitutionally 
based. Instead, the majority relies ,primarily on notions of comity, fi-
nality and federalism to conclude that "it scarcely seems logical to re-
quire federal courts to engage in the identical approach to' harmless 
error review that Chapman requires state courts to engage in on direct 
review. "161 
Given the broad'language of Brecht and the majority'S exclusive reli-
ance on "equitable principles," 'it would appear consistent for the 
Court to apply a different standard for cumulative error allegations 
when the claim is raised on direct appeal to a federal court than when 
it is presented by a habeas corpus petitioner. However, cumulative 
error is also distinguishable. While it may not be clear whether the 
I .. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764. 
1M Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723 (Stevens,j., concurring). 
l"Id. at 1727 (emphasis added) (quoting the majority at 1722). 
lSOId, at 1719. 
107 Id. at 1720. 
IMId. at 1732 (O'Connor, j., dissenting). 
109Id. at 1728 (O'Connor, j., dissenting) (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 
1756-58 (1993) (O'Connor, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
IMId. at 1726 (White,]., dissenting). See also id. at 1729 (O'Connor,j., dissenting). 
161Id. at 1721. 
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Chapman harmless error standard is constitutionally mandated, cer-
tainly an allegation that one has been deprived of a fair trial is a con-
stitutional claim. Cumulative error analysis usually centers on the 
fairness of the trial, and thus constitutes a cl;iim that the petitioner 
has been denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
While such claims are rarely successful, they are nonetheless constitu-
tionally based. Certainly, federal courts should not undertake cumula-
tive error analysis on habeas corpus in a manner which would enable a 
petitioner to circumvent other limitations on habeas review.162 How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit's four-prong test is too restrictive because it 
eliminates errors which, although individually are "non-constitu-
tional," may nonetheless have contributed to a fundamentally unfair 
trial. 
IV. WHEN Is AN ERROR NOT AN ERROR? 
The Derden mcyority correctly notes that federal court review of 
whether a petitioner has been denied a fair trial can become an "infi-
nitely expandable concept,"163 requiring courts to carefully define cu-
mulative error; however, the Fifth Circuit unduly restricts the "errors" 
a court may accumulate. 
A. "Actual Error" or "Adverse Event'? 
The court found that any claim of cumulative error must allege ac-
tual errors and not merely unfavorable or adverse events which are 
not erroneous.164 However, the Fifth Circuit's statement that conduct 
by the trial court which has cured the error exempts the error from 
the cumulative error analysis is unsupportable. First, a "curative" in-
struction by the court does not automatically cure an error. Instead, a 
court examines the instruction to determine whether the error is 
harmless. An error has still occurred; a curative instruction may sim-
ply make the error harmless. In review of federal criminal cases, most 
federal courts consider all harmless errors cumulatively whether con-
stitutional or non-constitutional.l65 Yet under Derden, in habeas 
corpus petitions, a curative instruction will downgrade the error to an 
adverse event and the court will exclude it from cumulative error 
analysis . 
••• See supra Section II. C. (The Unpersuasive E,ighth Circuit). 
'63 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1457. 
'64 See supra, Section III. A. 2 (The En Bane Court). 
'''''See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990) (en bane). 
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The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Rivera,166 emphasized that "cu-
mulative-error analysis aggregates only actual errors."167 The court 
stated that "[i]ndividual rulings frequently will have an adverse effect 
on a party, but unless that party can demonstrate that the ruling was 
an error, reversal would not be warranted."I68 The court defined er-
ror "generically to refer to any violation of an objective legal rule, ... 
[and] there must be violation of a constitutional, statutory, or common 
law, or a violation of an administrative regulation or an established 
rule of court."169 While not addressing the issue presented in Derden 
regarding the effect of a curative instruction, the Rivera court would 
appear to allow consideration of such an error for purposes of cumu-
lative error, and also consider the curative instruction in determining 
whether a defendant has been deprived of a fair trial. While Rivera 
was a federal criminal case, there is no reason to define error differ-
ently based on the procedural posture of a case. 
Under this prong, the en banc court in Derden eliminated the two 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct from cumulative error analysis. 
The court appeared to acknowledge that "the prosecutor admittedly 
overstepped his bounds under Mississippi law when in voir dire he 
tried to commit the jury to evaluate the co-conspirators' testimony like 
any other."170 However, based on the instruction given at the end of 
the trial, as well as the Mississippi Supreme Court's conclusion that 
the instruction removed the need to reverse Mr. Derden's conviction, 
the Fifth Circuit excluded this error from its cumulative error analy-
SiSPl Also excluded was the prosecutor's elicitation of testimony 
from co-conspirator Sherrod that Derden had been an accomplice in 
other robberies. Again, the court agreed that this constituted error, 
but due to the prompt instruction by the trial judge, excluded this 
error from its analysis of an aggregation of errors. 172 
B. Failure to Object 
When a defendant on direct review alleges an error to which she 
did not object at trial, federal courts require her to show "plain error," 
IMId. 
I.' Id. at 1470 (emphasis added). 
168 Id. at 1470-71. 
169 Id. at 1470 n.7 (emphasis added). 
170 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1460. 
17l Id. 
I72This conclusion was bolstered by the court's third prong, regarding errors of state law. 
The court concluded that neither error reached constitutional dimensions, thus could not 
be considered for purposes of cumulative error for this reason as well. 
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as defined by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.173 However, 
in habeas corpus petitions, where the petitioner has failed to object to 
an error at trial, the petitioner must show cause for failing to preserve 
the error and prejudice resulting from the alleged error. 174 When the 
habeas petitioner alleges cumulative error, the Fifth Circuit imposes 
the requirement that "a defendant [have] objected to errors to demon-
strate that they were believed at the time of trial to have had an ad-
verse effect on the defense, "175 before the court will consider the 
error in its cumulative error analysis. In federal cases on direct review, 
when an individual alleges cumulative error but has failed to preserve 
a claim by objecting at trial, courts apply the "plain error" rule.176 A 
different standard is not used simply because the appellant argues cu-
mulative error. Likewise, where a habeas petitioner alleges cumula-
tive error but has failed to preserve trial errors, courts should only 
exclude such errors from cumulative error review if the petitioner fails 
to meet the cause and prejudice standard. While this limited standard 
is difficult to meet, it at least provides a habeas corpus petitioner with 
an opportunity to have the error reviewed by a federal court. Instead, 
under Derden, failure to object to an error at trial will result in exclu-
sion of the error for purposes of cumulative error review apparently 
even if the petitioner is able to show cause and prejudice. 
This prong eliminated Mr. Derden's allegations that comments by 
the trial judge contributed to his deprivation of due process. While 
the en banc court characterized some of the trial judge'S comments as 
"ambiguous or imprudent,"177 "understandable,"178 and "regretta-
ble,"179 the court did not confront the question of whether either in-
dividually, or together they constituted "error" - the violation of an 
objective legal nile. Furthermore; 'without ever stating whether the 
judge'S comments amounted to error, the court concluded that "[o]n 
balance, the court ruled evenhandedly on both sides' objections."18o 
This really is not the point. The issue is whether the judge acted im-
properly. Examining the record as a whole before considering 
whether the comments were improper puts the cart before the horse. 
mUnited States v. Canales, 744 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1984); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain 
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not 
brought to the attention of the court."). 
174Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,88 (1977). See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 
536 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). 
t75 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1458. 
176United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). 
t'T7 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1459. 
17·Id. 
179 Id. 
I"" Id. at 1460. 
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As discussed in the next section, federal courts should first determine 
whether the alleged errors violated an objective legal rule. Upon de-
termining which allegations constitute errors, courts must then evalu-
ate the trial as a whole. The court in Derden appears to justify its 
conclusion that the judge's comments were not error based on its own 
evaluation of the entire record. The other flaw in the Derden court's 
analysis is that the court considered whether the trial judge'S conduct 
alone violated due process. This is similar to the court's treatment of 
errors of state law. 
C. State Law Errors 
As to the third limitation on cumulative error analysis the Fifth Cir-
cuit will not consider an alleged error of state law unless it rises to 
"constitutional dimension."181 Generally, errors of state law are not 
cognizable in habeas corpus unless they "so infused the trial with un-
fairness as to deny due process oflaw."182 This is the same Fourteenth 
Amendment due process analysis used for evaluating the cumulative 
effect of trial errors. This restricts cumulative error analysis to errors 
which are individually of constitutional dimensions. However, an er-
ror of state law is '~constitutional" only if it amounts to a due process 
violation. When a habeas corpus petitioner claims that the cumulative 
effect of errors denied her fundamental fairness, she alleges a due 
process violation. Again, while no single error of state law may entitle 
her to relief, several errors may have denied her a fair trial, and courts 
should consider this possibility. 
In Derden, this prong eliminated the prosecutorial errors of state law 
described earlier, concluding that "these violations of state law were 
not of a constitutional dimension."183 Instead, the court should have 
considered whether the cumulative effect of the errors of state law 
amounted to a due process violation. 
Regardless of the merits of Mr. Derden's habeas corpus petition, 
the Fifth Circuit has needlessly restricted the scope of cumulative er-
ror analysis. This type of allegation is rarely successful, and as Judge 
'8'Id. at 1458. 
'82 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 228 (1941). See also Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 
475 (1991); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983). 
'8' Derden, 978 F.2d at 1460. As to the police log discussed earlier, the en banc court 
simply disagreed with the panel that the evidence was either material or exculpatory, stat-
ing that "[t]he police might have acted on their report slowly." Id. 
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Higginbotham commented, the en banc majority took "a club to a 
pup and by doing so [told] the world that it is a wolf."184 
V. A PROPOSED ANALYSIS OF CUMULATIVE ERROR 
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that "formulating a complete defi-
nition of unconstitutional cumulative error is not feasible .... "185 In 
Derden, rather than establishing an approach explaining the types of 
errors to evaluate in a cumulative error allegation, the court elected to 
"eliminate certain types of complaints that should generally not be con-
sidered in cumulative error review."186 As discussed earlier, the Fifth 
Circuit's limitations on cumulative error analysis unnecessarily ex-
clude the possibility that several individually non-constitutional errors 
might operate in the aggregate to deprive a defendant of a fa,ir trial. 
In Taylor v. Kentucky,187 the Supreme Court did not find that the de-
fendant suffered one constitutional error. Rather, the Court held that 
several non-constitutional errors cumulatively deprived the defendant 
of a fair trial.188 Courts should afford a similar review to habeas 
corpus petitioners. The approach proposed within attempts to 
achieve a balance between the due process rights of habeas corpus 
petitioners and the Supreme Court's concerns for finality, comity, and 
federalism. It would eliminate only two types of claimed errors from 
cumulative error analysis. First, courts should not consider non-ex-
hausted claims. For example, if a petitioner alleges that the state 
court violated her right to confront the witnesses against her, but she 
failed to exhaust this claim in state court, she may not, in a federal 
habeas petition allege such a claim as part of a cumulative error alle-
gation. Second, federal courts should not consider Fourth Amend-
ment claims for purposes of cumulative error when the petitioner had 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in state court. Cumula-
tive error analysis should not include these claims because they are 
both barred from habeas corpus review. If a petitioner presents ex-
hausted and non-exhausted claims, a federal court must dismiss the 
petition and require the petitioner to present all non-exhausted 
claims to the state courts. Of course, the petitioner may decide to 
proceed with the habeas corpus petition as to the exhausted claims. If 
184 Id. at 1462 (Higginbotham, j., concurring) (cumulative error analysis is "quite nar-
row-as evidenced by the majority's inability to locate more than two instances from our 
thousands of habeas cases in which a state petitioner has succeeded with the argument."). 
'" Id. at 1458. 
186 Id. (emphasis added). 
18'436 U.S. 478 (1978). 
188 Id. at 487-88. 
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the petitioner makes this choice, he may not avoid the total exhaus-
tion rule by attempting to raise the non-exhausted claims in the form 
of a cumulative error allegation. 
There is an exception to the Stone-bar. Unlike exceptions to other 
limitations on habeas corpus review, the exception to Stone does not 
permit an examination of the Fourth Amendment claim per se. 
Rather, it allows a federal court to examine the adequacy of the state 
procedure for evaluating such a claim. Where a petitioner is unable 
to show that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate her 
Fourth Amendment claim in ~tate court, courts should not allow her 
to present the merits of the claim as part of a cumulative error allega-
tion. Aside from these two limitations, federal courts should consider 
any alleged error as part of cumulative error review. The following 
discussion describes the analytical steps which courts could employ in 
order to produce opinions which evaluate cumulative error claims in a 
more principled manner. 
A federal court should examine each alleged error and determine 
whether it in fact constitutes an error, under either constitutional or 
non-constitutional standards. In determining whether an error has 
occurred, courts should employ a broad definition of error to include 
"any violation of an objective legal rule. "189 At this point in the analy-
sis, courts should not simply conclude that an error, if error at all, was 
not of constitutional magnitude. The premise of cumulative error 
analysis is that several errors can operate in the aggregate to deny the 
petitioner a fair trial. Without confronting the question of whether 
the alleged error is actually an error, courts cannot evaluate a cumula-
tive error allegation. 
If an alleged error was an error, courts should then evaluate 
whether the individual error amounts to a constitutional error. Of 
course, if only one particular error amounted to a constitutional er-
ror, federal courts already evaluate the error to determine whether it 
was harmless. In evaluating the error for harmlessness, federal courts . 
examine the entire record and even consider "prejudicial circum-
stances" to determine whether the error was harmless. This step 
merely restates established law. 
If there are several constitutional errors, each of which individually 
was harmless, courts should then consider the cumulative effect of 
such errors. In United States v. Rivera,190 the Tenth Circuit described 
cumulative error as "an extension of the harmless-error rule, which is 
I •• United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 n.7 (lOth Cir. 1990) (en bane). 
190 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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used to determine whether an individual error requires reversal."191 
The court stated that "[a] cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates 
all the errors that individually have been found to be harmless, . . . 
and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the 
trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be 
harmless. "192 As with the evaluation of a single error's harmlessness, 
when judging the cumulative effect of several constitutional, but indi-
vidually harmless errors, courts should examine the entire record as a 
whole. 
Courts must then evaluate the relevance of individually non-consti-
tutional errors. Of course, the general rule is that habeas corpus re-
view is available to remedy only cons*utional defects. However, as 
discussed, a constitutional deprivation may result from several errors, 
each of which individually did not impair the defendant's constitu-
tional protections, but when considered in the aggregate denied the 
defendant a fair trial. This step seeks to pay deference to the limita-
tions on habeas corpus review, but allow for consideration of such a 
situation. Most importantly, cumulative error analysis should include 
errors of state law that individually are not of constitutional dimen-
sions. In Dcrdtm, the Fifth Circuit discounted two clear violations of 
state law by the prosecutor because individually, each error did not 
amount to a constitutional deprivation.193 My analysis would include 
these errors in a cumulative error analysis. 
I suggest that federal courts evaluate and characterize non-constitu-
tional errors into two categories: "actual errors" and "prejudicial cir-
cumstances." By categorizing non-constitutional errors in this way, 
courts will better understand the significance of these errors and be 
better prepared to evaluate the petitioner's trial for fundamental 
fairness. 
Courts should separate non-constitutional errors into "actual er-
rors" and "prejudicial circumstances." Actual errors would include 
any "defect, irregularity and variance"194 to which the petitioner ob-
jected at trial, and did not otherwise default, even if the alleged errors 
constitute violations of state law. Furthermore, when the petitioner 
objected at trial, and the trial judge sustained the objection, or in-
structed the jury in an effort to "cure" the error, courts should still 
consider this an "actual error" and consider the curative instruction in 
,., Id. at 1469. 
'92 Id. at 1470. 
I •• See supra Section IV. c. (State lAw Errors) . 
'''FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2111. 
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their evaluation of the entire trial. In United States v. Berry,195 the 
Ninth Circuit determined that for purposes of cumulative error analy-
sis, the court would consider "errors and instances of misconduct 
which we earlier held were adequately cured by the court's instruc-
tion. We recognize that a trace of prejudice may remain even after a 
proper instruction is given. If we find a residue of prejudice, we will 
take it into account."196 Similarly, in Derden, the court should have 
included the violations committed by the prosecutor despite the fact 
that the judge properly instructed the jury. A curative instruction as 
to Mr. Derden's alleged involvement in other robberies was given 
promptly. However, this evidence was extremely prejudicial, espe-
cially in a case where Mr. Derden's credibility was crucial since the 
only evidence tying him to the burglary was the testimony of the ad-
mitted burglars. While the trial judge eventually instructed the jury as 
to the correct law regarding the testimony of co-conspirators, this in-
struction came at the end of the trial, while the error occurred at the 
beginning.197 Again, the court should have considered the facts sur-
. rounding the error" and the putative curative instruction, rather than 
simply excluding the error from cumulative error analysis. 
In addition, when the petitioner failed to object at trial or otherwise 
defaulted, courts should still consider an allegation as "actual error," 
rather than a "prejudicial circumstance," if the petitioner is able to 
show "cause and prejudice" pursuant to Wainwright v. Sykes. 198 Again, 
when a claim of error is not part of a cumulative error argument, fed-
eral courts will consider non-preserved errors if the petitioner can 
meet the "cause and prejudice" standard.199 Courts should not aban-
don this standard simply because the petitioner seeks habeas corpus 
relief based on the cumulative effect of errors. In Derden, the Fifth 
Circuit stated that "none of the judge's comments is even an obvious 
abuse of discretion."2oo It is not clear whether the court intended to 
imply the "cause and prejudice" standard and simply concluded that 
Mr. Derden failed to meet this with respect to the judge's remarks. 
'"'627 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1980), em. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). 
19·Id. at 201. The court ultimately held that there was no "cumulative prejudice" and 
affirmed the conviction. 
'97 See supra discussion in Section III. A. 1. (The Panel Majority). 
'
98433 U.S. 72 (1977). Certainly, where the allegation is procedurally barred, habeas 
corpus petitioners should consider framing their complaint as one of ineffective assistance 
of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669 (1984). See Peter W. Tague, Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work to do, 
31 STAN. L. REv. 1, 5 n.25 (1978). 
'99 See supra Section IV. B. (Failure to Object). 
2("'Derden v. McNee~ 978 F.2d 1453, 1460 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), em. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
2928 (1993). 
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Nor is it clear that an abuse of discretion standard applies to state-
ments by a judge which the defendant claims could have led the '~ury 
to believe that Derden and his counsel were not to be believed. "201 
The court should have more closely examined whether the judge's 
comments either separately or together were improper, then analyzed 
whether Mr. Derden was able to show "cause and prejudice," as to 
those comments which were error, since he did not object to them at 
trial. 
"Prejudicial circumstances" consist of those events to which the peti-
tioner failed to object, and cannot meet the "cause and prejudice" 
standard, but otherwise constituted errors. Courts should consider 
such circumstances not as part of the aggregation of error, but rather 
as part of their evaluation of the overall fairness of the petitioner's 
trial. Certainly, courts should not consider events which do not pass 
the above threshold standard of constituting an error at all as either 
an "actual error" or a "prejudicial circumstance." However, if Mr. 
Derden demonstrated that some of the judge'S comments were error, 
but he was unable to show "cause and prejudice," under my analysis, 
the Fifth Circuit would have considered the comments "prejudicial 
circumstances" and evaluated the "actual errors" in light of the "preju-
dicial circumstances" to determine whether Mr. Derden was denied a 
fair trial. 
Once a court has determined the nature of the alleged errors, the 
final step is to examine the record as a whole to determine whether 
the petitioner was deprived of a fair trial. In conducting such an eval-
uation, courts should devote particular attention to the relatedness of 
the errors. The best way to explain this concept is to examine some 
examples. 
In Walker v. Engle,202the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted 
habeas corpus relief on the basis that several errors operated cumula-
tively to deprive Walker of a fair trial. Walker had been charged with 
felony murder. Two men who had been convicted of involvement in 
the crime testified that Walker was the triggerman who killed a police 
officer. Walker's alibi was that he was confined in the Cuyahoga 
County Jail on the day of the robbery and killing. The state's response 
was to introduce evidence showing that the officers who ran the jail 
were "so corrupt and/ or ineffective that Walker could have gotten out 
of jail before [the robbery] and then returned."203 
201 Derdm, 938 F.2d at 611 (panel opinion). 
202703 F.2d 959 (6th Cir.), em. dmied, 464 U.S. 951, 464 U.S. 962 (1983). 
!o' [d. at 961-62. 
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On habeas, the Sixth Circuit considered the cumulative effect of 
primarily evidentiary errors on the fairness of the petitioner's trial. 
Acknowledging that errors of state law regarding the admissibility of 
evidence are generally not cognizable hi federal habeas corpus review, 
the court determined that Walker's "trial was inflamed by marginally 
relevant and irrelevant evidence that was highly prejudicial ... [which] 
allow[ed] the trial to focus more on the claimed corruption of the 
Sheriff's Department than on the issue of Walker's guilt or 
innocence. "204 
Specifically, witnesses were allowed to testify as to the Warden's 
criminal convictions which occurred long after the robbery and mur-
der for which Walker was charged.205 An examiner for the State Audi-
tor was allowed to testify as to inaccuracies and shortages in the jail's 
commissary account funds. 206 Aggravating this error, the prosecutor 
argued in closing that the records were introduced" [t] 0 show you that 
all the thieves and the bad people weren't on the inside of the jail; 
that if you lie and steal [sic] what says you won't let a prisoner out for a 
weekend or a few days."207 The state was allowed to put a witness on 
the stand who refused to swear in, and then through other witnesses 
was permitted to "suggest to the jury that [the unsworn witness'] testi-
mony would have been helpful to the prosecution had he testified. "208 
All of these errors related to the issue of the corruption and ineffec-
tiveness of the jail's personnel, an issue which had little to no rele-
vance to Walker's guilt or innocence. In considering cumulative error 
allegations, federal courts should be especially sensitive to situations 
where several errors are related to a particular problem, such as dis-
tracting the jury from the issue of guilt or innocence. 
Another example of the importance of examining the relationship 
among several errors is Cooper v. SowderS.209 As in Walker, the errors 
alleged by Cooper were violations of state law, and the Sixth Circuit 
acknowledged that federal courts are not to consider an error of state 
law unless that error amounts to a denial of due process. Nonetheless, 
the court examined the cumulative effect of such errors, even though 
each error, individually, did not result in a deprivation of due process. 
In Cooper, the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief from a state 
conviction of murder. The first alleged error was that a police officer 
was allowed to testify that during his investigation of the murder he 
-Id. at 968 . 
• 0. Id. at 963 . 
• 06 Id. at 963-64. 
'07Id. at 964 . 
• 08 Id . 
• 
09 837 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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"found no evidence that would link any of those other suspects to this 
crime. . .. The only evidence we found that would link anybody to 
this crime would be Mr. Cooper. "210 The court found that this testi-
mony constituted error because it "suggest[ed] to thejury the guilt of 
the accused and the innocence of other suspects, "211 thus invading 
the province of the jury. The court also found error with the trial 
judge's comments that the police officer was an "expert."212 Firstly, 
there was no proof as to the officer's qualifications as an expert,21S 
and secondly, there was nothing specialized about the officer's opin-
ion, to even require that he be an expert.214 The third error found 
was with the police informant's testimony who was permitted to testify 
that he had provided information in the past, which had led to arrests 
and convictions.215 The court found that this testimony bolstering the 
informant's credibility was not relevant and was prejudicia1.216 Each 
of these errors related to the credibility of the state's witnesses, which 
in turn impinged on the credibility of the defendant. The issue of 
credibility is especially relevant when the evidence against the defend-
ant is not overwhelming and when, as in Cooper, the case against the 
defendant is a "close" one.217 
United States v. Wallace,218 although a federal criminal case, is an-
other example of how a court should consider the cumulative effect of 
errors on the defendant's credibility. In Wallace, the defendant was 
convicted of conspiracy and of possession with intent 'to distribute her-
oin.219 The government witness who provided the crucial testimony 
linking Wallace to the distribution of heroin was provided by an ad-
mitted co-conspirator, Sterling.220 Wallace alleged that the govern-
ment did not provide her with Sterling'S written notes which Sterling 
testified that she had referred to while testifying before the grand 
jury.221 The Ninth Circuit found that the government's failure to pro-
duce these notes was error, but remanded to the district court to de-
termine whether the error was harmless.222 
.'OId. at 287. 
211 Id. (quoting Cooper v. Kentucky, No. 84-SC494-MR, slip op. at 2 (Liesbon, J., 
dissenting» . 
·'·Id. at 287-88 . 
.,. Id. at 288 . 
• ,. Id . 
• ,. Id. 
·'·Id . 
• 17 Id . 
• 
,8 848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1988), aJfd, 902 F.2d 1580 (1990). 
·'·Id. at 1466. 
220 Id. at 1467. 
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The court also found that the district court improperly allowed the 
government to impeach Wallace with a heroin conviction which was 
over ten years old.223 The court further found that the prosecutor 
engaged in improper vouching during the direct examination of Ster-
ling and during closing arguments.224 The court noted that the de-
fense did not object at trial, but concluded that the district court must 
review the entire record to determine whether the improper vouching 
amounted to "plain error."225 Finally, the court found that although 
Wallace was given Miranda warnings upon her arrest, the district court 
erred in holding that she had waived her rights, and that her subse-
quent statements should not have been admitted at trial.226 
The court remanded the case stating: 
[a]lthough each of the above errors, looked at separately, 
may not rise to the level of reversible error, their cumulative 
effect may nevertheless be so prejudicial to [Wallace] that re-
versal is required .... Our court is particularly sensitive to 
allegations of prejudice where, as here, the convictions are 
based on the largely uncorroborated testimony of a single 
accomplice or co-conspirator.227 
The court further emphasized that due to the "credibility contest 
between the defendants and the co-conspirator witness, we are partic-
ularly troubled by the possible cumulative effect of those errors which 
go to the credibility of the witnesses. "228 
In a footnote, the court explained the relevance of the 
prosecutorial vouching, to which the defendant failed to object, stat-
ing,"[a]lthough the [prosecutorial] vouching was unobjected to at trial 
and may not alone amount to plain error, it is, in any event, relevant 
to the central issue of Sterling's credibility. Considered with the con-
duct that was error, the vouching may have contributed to prejudice 
to [Wallace] ."229 Thus the Ninth Circuit will consider errors which 
otherwise are precluded from direct appeal review under a cumulative 
error analysis. Under my proposed analysis for cases, if the improper 
vouching did not meeting the "cause and prejudice" standard, a court 
.25 Id. at 1472-73. 
"4Id. at 1473-74. 
22. Id. at 1474 . 
• 2·Id. at 1475 . 
• 27 Id. at 1475 (citations omitted) . 
.. ald. at 1476. 
229 Id. n.21. See also United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 201 n.7 (9th Cir. 1980) ("We do 
not decide whether several errors may constitute 'plain error' in the aggregate or whether, 
once we decline to review an error, we may no longer consider it for any purpose."). 
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would consider it a prejudicial circumstance in its evaluating the trial 
as a whole. 
In Derden, credibility was the crucial issue. The only evidence 
presented by the state which linked Mr. Derden to the burglary was 
the testimony of the three admitted burglars. Much of their testimony 
was not only uncorroborated, but was often contradicted by the co-
conspirators and other state witnesses. Thus, the court should have 
evaluated the errors in terms of their effect on the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
Nearly every error alleged by Mr. Derden concerned the credibility 
of the state's witnesses, as well as the credibility of Mr. Derden himself. 
The prosecutor's erroneous voir dire questioning improperly bolstered 
the credibility of the admitted burglars who testified against Derden. 
The erroneous admission at trial of Mr. Derden's alleged prior crimi-
nal conduct directly impinged upon Mr. Derden's credibility.· The 
trial judge's hostile comments toward Mr. Derden and his counsel 
could have led the jury to disbelieve Mr. Derden and his attorney. 
Certainly, different judges will evaluate differently claims that one 
has been deprived of a fair trial, and so it seems was the case for Mr. 
Derden. The proposed analysis does not solve this "know it when I see 
it problem." However, by forcing reviewing judges to more candidly 
confront the question of what constitutes an "error," and to evaluate 
the relationship among the errors, the proposal may result in opin-
ions which move away from free-floating notions of fairness, without 
unnecessarily restricting the due process clause for habeas corpus' 
petitioners. 
